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Abstract: 
I argue for the view that envy and jealousy are distinct emotions, whose crucial difference is that 
envy involves a perception of lack while jealousy involves a perception of loss. I start by noting 
the common practice of using ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ almost interchangeably, and I contrast it with 
the empirical evidence that shows that envy and jealousy are distinct, albeit similar and often co-
occurring, emotions. I then argue in favor of a specific way of understanding their distinction: 
the view that envy is a response to a perceived lack of a valuable object, while jealousy is a 
response to a perceived loss of a valuable object. I compare such a view with the most compelling 
alternative theories, and show that it accounts better for paradigmatic cases.  I conclude by 
showing how the lack vs. loss model can handle complications: ambiguous cases, that is, when it is 
epistemically unclear whether one experiences lack or loss; hybrid cases, that is, when one seems 
to experience both lack and loss; and borderline cases, that is, when it is metaphysically unclear 
whether one experiences lack or loss. 
 
1. Introduction: Two Different Green-Eyed Monsters 
Here is an exceedingly simplified version of Othello (spoilers ahead): Iago perceives 
himself as being worse off than Othello, and he is pained by this perception. He 
thus plots to take away his happiness and success. He makes him believe that his 
wife Desdemona has an affair with his friend Cassio. His plot succeeds and ruin 
ensues for Othello, Desdemona and many others close to them. 
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 Iago and Othello feel emotions that most readers have no trouble 
recognizing: Iago is envious, and Othello is jealous.1 Even though readers may use 
the word ‘jealous’ in both cases, they will talk about the corresponding emotions 
in different ways. They might say that Iago lacks Othello’s status or fortune, and 
wants to pull him down to his level by spoiling his fortune. Othello, on the other 
hand, is trying to protect his loving relationship with Desdemona. I take Othello’s 
and Iago’s emotions to be paradigmatic cases of jealousy and envy, respectively. 
Envy and jealousy are thus symmetrical, in the sense that they motivate the 
agents in two opposite directions: Othello is protecting from an external threat a 
good he perceives himself as having, while Iago is coveting a good he perceives 
himself as lacking. The play’s tragic events stem from Iago’s ability to pursue his 
malicious aims and from Othello’s incapacity to protect his valuable relationship 
with Desdemona in the right way from the real threat (that is, Iago, not Cassio). 
Neither envy nor jealousy need always be so nefarious or unwarranted, although it 
is their destructive and irrational features that tend to motivate our scholarly or 
literary interest in them.  
Even though envy and jealousy can be recognized as different and 
symmetrical in paradigmatic cases, they share many similar features. Both are 
emotions with a triadic structure: they involve an agent or subject, a good or 
object, and a target or the person the emotion is felt toward.2 Both are rivalrous in 
that the target is conceived of as a rival or competitor, and in particular the rivalry 
                                                
1 More precisely, I should say: Iago is often interpreted as being envious, and Othello is often interpreted as being 
jealous. But here I am interested in the layperson’s response, setting aside hermeneutical scholarly debates. 
2 This point is controversial and I am going to defend it later. 
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is conceived of in comparative and, often but not always, positional terms: the 
competition is such that one’s loss is the other’s gain, and one’s worth is seen as at 
least partially determined by the other’s.3 Both are affectively aversive, in the sense 
that they are painful to experience, because they negatively affect the agent’s self-
esteem. Finally, they sometimes co-occur in the same agent: the same person can 
feel both envy and jealousy directed at the same person. It is in virtue of these 
similarities that envy and jealousy are often confused with one another in our 
everyday discourse and even in introspection. 
In this paper, I argue that the difference between envy and jealousy is best 
understood according to a specific model of the appraisal dimensions of these two 
emotions, which I will refer to as “lack vs. loss model”. The first section examines 
a peculiar linguistic phenomenon that occurs in English and other languages: the 
conflation between ‘jealousy’ and ‘envy’. Such a linguistic conflation—in particular 
the fact that jealousy has a wider semantic scope that envy—might lead to think 
of envy as just a particular form of jealousy. However, this popular impression is 
wrongheaded: the scholarly consensus is that envy and jealousy are distinct 
emotions. The second section reconstructs how this consensus has come about in 
social psychology, while also detailing the empirical evidence concerning the ways 
in which envy and jealousy differ. The third section goes on to argue that such 
evidence is best accounted by the lack vs. loss model: envy is a response to a 
perceived potential or actual lack of a valuable object, while jealousy is a response 
to a perceived potential or actual loss of a valuable object. The fourth section 
                                                
3 I thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to make the comparative element more explicit.  
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analyzes competing models (the most persuasive of which is the view that jealousy 
essentially involves the need for attention while envy does not) and shows that the 
lack vs. loss model better accounts for paradigmatic cases, on the one hand, and 
empirical evidence, on the other. The fifth and final section demonstrates how my 
view can handle complications: ambiguous cases, that is, when it is epistemically 
unclear whether one experiences lack or loss; hybrid cases, that is, when one seems 
to experience both lack and loss; and borderline cases, that is, when it is 
metaphysically unclear whether one experiences lack or loss. 
 
2. When ‘Jealous’ Means Envious: Linguistic Conflation and Empirical 
Distinctness 
In several languages, including English, it is common to use ‘jealousy’ and ‘jealous’ 
in lieu of ‘’envy’ and ‘envious’. This practice is reflected in dictionary definitions. 
The Oxford English Dictionary lists the following as the second non-obsolete 
meaning of ‘jealousy’: 
“The state of mind arising from the suspicion, apprehension, or knowledge of rivalry; in 
respect of success or advantage: fear of losing some good through the rivalry of another; 
resentment or ill-will towards another on account of advantage or superiority, possible 
or actual, on his part; envy, grudge.”4 
Both ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ derive from French words (‘envie’ and ‘jalousie’, 
respectively), and the same phenomenon of using ‘jealousy’ as a synonym for 
‘envy’ can be found in French. Even though this linguistic phenomenon is not 
                                                
4 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/100958?redirectedFrom=jealousy#eid Similar definitions can be 
found in Merriam-Webster: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/jealous?show=0&t=1316726021 
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exclusive to English, it is particularly relevant to discussing the English case, given 
that much of the empirical literature on the topic is authored by native English 
speakers, whose studies and experiments mostly target other native English 
speakers, and given that our linguistic practices are known to influence the way we 
think about our emotional experience.5  
 Sociologist Helmut Schoeck (Schoeck 1969: 71-2) and anthropologist 
George Foster (Foster 1972: 167-8), authors of pivotal works in the contemporary 
research on envy, lament this linguistic phenomenon as an unfortunate source of 
confusion for scholarly investigation. Both claim that the terms are used 
synonymously, but social psychologists have subsequently casted doubt on the claim 
that the two terms are perfect synonyms. Maury Silver and John Sabini (Silver and 
Sabini 1978) are the first to speculate an asymmetry: ‘jealousy’ encompasses a 
range of meanings that include those of ‘envy’, but not vice versa.  
Ten years later, Gerrod Parrott, Sung Hee Kim and Richard Smith (Smith 
et al. 1988) provide evidence confirming this linguistic asymmetry, and also, more 
interestingly, they show that the two emotions are phenomenologically 
experienced as distinct even by English speakers: envy is more likely to be 
characterized by feelings of inferiority and self-criticism, wishfulness and longing, 
and a motivation to self-improve; jealousy is more likely to be characterized by 
feelings of suspiciousness and distrust, rejection and hurt, hostility and anger at 
others, and fear of loss.  
                                                
5 To what extent, it is debatable (Prinz 2011). The influence of language on how we conceptualize 
emotions is relevant also when we think about different kinds of envy.  
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In later studies (Parrott and Smith 1993) Parrott and Smith made two 
further discoveries. First, that the co-occurrence of envy and jealousy is also 
asymmetrical: jealousy is almost always accompanied by some envy for the rival, 
but the opposite does not hold. Second, that envy is characteristically associated 
with concern for public disapproval, while jealousy is associated with self-
righteousness. This second result is relevant to understanding the linguistic 
asymmetry: jealous people do not worry about hiding their jealousy, because 
jealousy, albeit condemned when excessive, is less stigmatized than envy and 
considered more legitimate. Consequently, it makes sense for ‘jealousy’ to 
incorporate some of envy’s meaning, but not the opposite.6  
In the next section I will propose that such an asymmetry in social 
response is best accounted for by the lack vs. loss model, but for now notice that 
we can easily see our different attitudes toward jealousy and envy in fictional 
representations. The envious are usually depicted as unappealing characters, most 
often villains toward whom we feel no sympathy whatsoever. The jealous can be 
heroes, even when they commit hideous crimes, and are depicted as struggling 
with all too human internal demons. We hate and fear the Iagos, while we pity and 
empathize with the Othellos. 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Further confirmation of both the linguistic conflation and differentiation of the two emotions can be 
found in a taxometric analysis performed by Nick Haslam and Brian Bornstein (Haslam and Bornstein 
1996). This study goes beyond Parrott and Smith’s findings, in that it not only confirms the qualitative 
differences between envy and jealousy, but also shows that envy and jealousy are discrete complex 
affective kinds rather than different regions of the same continuous affective domain. 
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3. To Lose Or To Lack, That Is The Question 
Even though most scholars agree that that envy and jealousy are distinct 
emotions, they disagree on what this difference consists in. A recurring suggestion 
across disciplines is that envy is, in some sense to be further specified, about lack, 
while jealousy is about loss. Anthropologist George Foster, mentioned above, may 
be the first to articulate this view in the contemporary debate. He describes them 
as typical affective reactions to different situational antecedents:7   
“Envy stems from the desire to acquire something possessed by another person, 
while jealousy is rooted in the fear of losing something already possessed. In 
schematic form both emotions involve a dyad, a pair of individuals whose 
relationships is mediated, or structured, by an intervening property or object. The 
intervening object may take innumerable forms, such as wealth, a material good, 
the love and affection of a human being, or it may be intangible, such as fame or 
good reputation. The mediating property is possessed by one member of the 
dyad; the other member does not possess it, but wishes to. […] Jealousy is thus 
seen to be the normal counterpart of envy” (Foster 1972: 168, my emphasis). 
Foster suggests a case of romantic rivalry as an example: a man may be envious of 
another for his attractive partner, and, if the other man is made aware of being the 
target of envy, he will become jealous of him. 
                                                
7 The great majority of discussion of envy and jealousy takes place, often implicitly, within the background 
of appraisal theories. In this family of emotion theories, emotions are differentiated by their patterns of 
appraisal or evaluation. I share this common assumption, and interpret the lack vs. loss view, which is 
present in many different disciplinary contexts, as a model that focuses on this specific appraisal 
dimension. While appraisal theories tend to be seen as necessarily conceiving of emotions as natural kinds, 
Andrew Ortony and Gerald Clore (2015) have recently argued that it need not be the case, and that the 
account of emotions they developed with Allan Collins (the so-called “OCC model,” from the authors’ 
names) is an appraisal theory that is compatible with a psychological constructionist account, that is, one 
that takes emotions to be “perceiver-dependent products of the human mind” (Barrett and Russell 2015: 
13). I would like to remain uncommitted as to whether envy and jealousy are natural kinds. I thank an 
anonymous reviewer for prompting me to clarify my assumptions here. 
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The idea is elegant and simple and can be captured in the motto: envy 
covets what jealousy guards. It accounts easily for cases of envy and jealousy that 
are pre-theoretically taken to be paradigmatic. Consider again Othello: Othello is 
jealous of Cassio because he thinks he is threatening his relationship to her, a 
relationship he sees as exclusive. Iago is envious of Othello because he thinks he 
lacks his reputation and honorable qualities.  
Romantic rivalry is the paradigmatic context in which we normally think 
about jealousy, and in that context it is common for envy to co-occur in the same 
agent toward the same target, that is, for a lover to be both jealous and envious of 
their rival.8 The lack vs. loss model explains this co-occurrence easily: the lover 
perceives the other person not only as threatening a possession (the loving 
relationship), but also as having something the lover does not have (a particular 
quality, or the capacity to attract the beloved in a way that is disruptive of the 
relationship, etc.).9  
This model also easily explains the asymmetries introduced in the previous 
section. The linguistic asymmetry (the fact that we often say “jealous” when we 
mean ‘envious’) is due to the desire to avoid social stigma: we trade on the 
similarities between the two emotions to admit only the one that is less shameful, 
even if sometimes we are actually feeling the other, whether we are aware of it or 
                                                
8 Cf. previous discussion of Parrott and Smith 1993. Haslam and Bornstein 1996 remark that if envy and 
jealousy were not distinct, we could not properly speak of co-occurrence.  
9 Envy and jealousy can also co-occur in the same agent, but directed at different targets. 
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not. But what explains the different social response? The fact that we do not have 
a right to what others have, but we do have a right to defend what’s ours.10  
Furthermore, according to the studies comparing the phenomenology of 
the two emotions, envy is more strongly associated with feelings of comparative 
inferiority and shame than envy (Parrott and Smith 1993). Once again, this is not 
surprising if we think that envy involves or stems from seeing oneself as lacking 
what another person has, and jealousy involves or stems from seeing oneself as 
having something the other person does not. Of course, this is not a stable 
difference: intense jealousy may be a consequence of lack of self-esteem or 
insecurity about one’s situation, and thus might involve envying the rival (I will 
discuss these cases in the last section). 
Admitting envy thus implies admitting one’s perceived inferiority. 
Furthermore, in most people’s conception, envy also involves a desire to deprive 
another person of something valuable that this other person rightfully owns:11 no 
surprise people fear envy from others and deny it when they feel it! Jealousy, on 
the other hand, seems more excusable, an emotion we’d rather not feel nor be the 
target of, but understandable as a response to a perceived threat. 
The normative aspects that are at stake here become even more salient in 
the philosophical renditions of the lack vs. loss model. Several philosophers 
                                                
10 We do have a right to what others have, if the distribution of goods has been unfair. But then the 
warranted emotion is resentment, not envy, a difference discussed at length in the literature. 
11 While envy is often perceived as malicious and implying this aggressive desire, it can actually be benign 
(see van de Ven et al. 2009, 2011, 2014, and Protasi, 2016). But malicious envy is a lot more salient in the 
comparison to jealousy and this salience determines the asymmetries discussed here. 
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present a version of the distinction, but I find Gabriele Taylor’s account the most 
insightful one (Taylor 1988, 2006).12  
She starts by highlighting the dimensions along which the two emotions 
are similar, similarities that account for the reason why they are often confused 
with each other: both are hostile toward the person the emotion is directed at, and 
are unpleasant for the agent to experience. Furthermore “[i]n both cases the 
person experiencing the emotion sees herself as standing in some relation to the 
valued good, where this good may be some material possession, a social position 
or position of relative power, a personal quality, or some kind of personal 
relationship.” (Taylor 1988: 233)  
I take it that by valued, Taylor means subjectively valued by the agent, as 
opposed to objectively valuable. Both envy and jealousy are painful for the agent 
because they involve something the agent cares about from a subjective 
perspective, even when they may not be objective goods.13  
                                                
12. Other philosophers endorsing this model are Neu 1980, Ben-Ze’ev 1990, Purshouse 2004, and 
Konyndyk DeYoung 2009. 
13 One might object to this characterization that we often desire, or even ache for, things even if we don’t 
subjectively value them (I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this objection). It seems to me 
that there are three kinds of such cases. First, there are addictions, such as when we crave a cigarette or a 
drink, even though we might think they are bad for us (so we do not just not value them: we positively 
disvalue them). But it seems to me that addictions are a complicated case, deserving a separate treatment. 
The second kind of cases is when we desire things that we do not value because they are instrumental in 
conducing to something else that we value. So, for instance I might not value certain marks of professional 
prestige, perhaps because I think they are not based on merit alone, and nonetheless value the benefits that 
stem from them, such as doing one’s job better. As a consequence, I may find myself being envious of 
someone who enjoys that kind of prestige. In that case, it seems to me that this is still a case of valuing 
something as good, even though one might be less aware or conscious that one holds such a value. Finally, 
there are cases in which entrenched rivalries cause one to be disposed to be jealous or envious of another 
person, quite independently of specific valued goods. Even then, though, there must be some object that 
has to be at least fleetingly and superficially perceived as good, what I would call “triggering good”. 
 11 
Another way of framing the relation between the object of envy and 
jealousy and the self is to think of it as connected to the agent’s identity.14 We do 
not feel envy with regard to things that we do not personally care about or within 
domains that are not relevant to our sense of self. For instance, one can 
acknowledge the value of certain sports achievements without feeling envy toward 
someone outperforming them in it (Cialdini et al. 1976). Nor do we commonly feel 
jealousy in the context of relationships that may be valuable and relevant to our 
well-being but do not affect the sense of who we are, such as many working 
relationships.  
Taylor goes on to say that the relation between the agent and the good is 
perceived as unfavorable because: 
“the good in question is thought of as either about to be lost or as not being in 
one’s possession and probably unavailable. The person experiencing jealousy 
believes or imagines there to be a threat to a valued possession of hers or to 
something she expects or hopes to possess. The loss would, in her view, leave 
her worse off than she was before or hoped that she would be. Her first concern 
is, therefore, the protection of this possession or hoped-for possession. The 
person feeling envy, on the other hand, thinks of herself as being deprived in 
comparison with another who is, in the relevant respect, better off than she is. 
Unlike the jealous person, the envious one cannot be concerned with trying to 
maintain the status quo. On the contrary, she will want to eliminate the 
discrepancy between herself and the other, she will want in some way to better 
                                                
14 Taylor mentions the role of self-image and sense of identity in various parts of the essay; see also Ben-
Ze’ev 1990. Cf. Smith and Kim 2007 for the extensive empirical literature on the connection between self-
identity and envy.  
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her position. The initial difference, then, lies in the agent’s respective relation to 
the valued good.” (Taylor 1988: 233, emphasis in the original).   
In addition to the different appraisal elements already seen in Foster, Taylor 
articulates the crucial motivational difference between envy and jealousy, which 
stems from an opposite evaluation of the status quo, that is, the perception of an 
unequal relation to a valued good: in the case of envy, the agent perceives oneself 
as worse off, and thus yearns for the change, and is motivated to bring it about; in 
the case of jealousy, the agent perceives oneself as better off, and thus loathes the 
change, and is motivated to prevent it.   
Thus, both emotions can be conceptualized as rivalrous emotions, where 
the person targeted by the emotion is seen as a rival or competitor. Often, this 
competition is seen as a zero-sum game, where only one person can win the good. 
This is particularly common in cases of romantic jealousy felt within the context 
of monogamous relationships, and is also typical of envy felt within the context of 
sport competitions or other cases where the good is exclusive, such as a coveted 
job. Both emotions, then, essentially involve a comparison between the agent and 
the target.15 
To sum up, envy and jealousy are both unpleasant emotions targeted at 
another person that is conceived of as a rival or competitor of sort, who stands in 
a relation to a valued good in a way that is different from the agent’s: in the case 
of envy, the target is perceived as better off, possessing what the agent lacks; in 
the case of jealousy, the target is perceived as worse off, lacking what the agent 
                                                
15 I thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to highlight this element. 
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possesses (at least in her perception). Consequently, the envier is motivated to 
overcome her comparative disadvantage, possibly by depriving the envied of the 
good, while the jealous is motivated to protect her comparative advantage, 
possibly by fending attacks from the rival and/or locking away the good. 
Taylor, like virtually any other participant to this debate, highlights how the 
typical good at stake in jealousy is a personal relationship, often, but not 
necessarily, a romantic one. This is another important difference between envy 
and jealousy: while one may be envious of someone’s partner, envy is by no 
means typically about another person’s relationships. Rather, almost anything 
perceived as valuable can be an object of envy. Jealousy is, instead, almost always 
concerned with personal relationships. In my view, it is this very fact about 
jealousy that ultimately motivates the majority of competing views on the 
distinction between envy and jealousy, which I am going to discuss in the next 
section. 
 
4. Alternative Accounts  
The lack vs. loss model enjoys a wide, interdisciplinary support, and yet it is not 
the only model available in the literature. In this section I explore some alternative 
accounts, and I show why the lack vs. loss model is superior to them. 
4.1 Dyad vs. Triad Model  
I start with the most popular, but also less persuasive alternative account, which 
focuses on a formal feature: the number of parties involved in the two emotions.16 
                                                
16 Cf. for instance Farrell 1980, whose account also shares some elements of both the lack vs. loss account 
and attention-based accounts. In fact, precisely because this model does not focus on appraisal, it is 
compatible with the lack vs. loss model, and many authors endorse both, e.g. Konstan 2006, Ben-Ze’ev 
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The difference between envy and jealousy is supposed to be that jealousy is a 
three-party relation, while envy involves only two parties. In both cases, there is 
an agent, the subject of the emotion—that’s one party. Then, in the case of 
jealousy, there are two other parties: the rival and the partner. Those who favor 
this view think of jealousy exclusively as a matter of triads of people involved in 
personal, generally romantic, relationships, and not as an emotion that can be 
directed toward a non-animated object (as in “He jealously guarded his 
possessions”). Envy involves only one other party, other than the subject: the 
coveted good.17 
The problem is that such an account fails to differentiate envy from mere 
coveting, or wish to have an object that one lacks. Envy is experienced and 
conceptualized as comparative: the object is possessed by someone else, and it is 
that comparative disadvantage that is characteristic of the emotional experience of 
envy, not the mere lack of a desired object, as unpleasant or intense as that may 
be. I envy you because you are smarter, or you have more money than me, or you 
have been invited to that cool party and I haven’t. It seems, then, that envy is also 
always a three-party relation. 
There is, however, a difference between envy and jealousy regarding the 
nature of the parties involved, due to the fact that the most intense jealousy we 
                                                
2000, and Parrott and Smith 1993. For reasons that will be clear soon, however, I find holding both views 
to be explanatorily redundant.  
17 Justin D’Arms argues that envy and jealousy are both three-place relations, but only jealousy involves 
three parties (D’Arms 2009: 3). I find this distinction unpersuasive, since one may well be envious of the 
romantic relationship X has with Y (so also envy can involve three parties), as observed in Purshouse 2004: 
185, and vice versa one may be jealous of inanimate objects (therefore jealousy need not involve three 
parties).  
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feel, the one that we talk the most about, and that affects our lives the most, is 
relational jealousy. Thus, it is a contingent feature of jealousy that the third party 
involved, the object that we fear losing, is almost always a person, rather than a 
non-animated object, abstract or material. As a consequence, while envy is 
targeted only at one person (the envied), jealousy is often targeted at two: the 
beloved, and the person who is perceived as threatening the relationship with the 
beloved.  
However, another way of expressing this difference is to say that the 
typical object of jealousy is a relationship with a person. The symmetry with envy is 
thus preserved: in both cases there is a subject who feels the emotion, a valued 
object that the subjects desires to not lose or to gain, and a rival who either 
threatens to take away the object or who already possesses it. The lack vs. loss 
model is thus capable of explaining away the apparent asymmetry between envy 
and jealousy that is highlighted in the two-party/three-party account, while 
preserving other more robust, empirically-supported, asymmetries. 
4.2 Object-Based Model 
Another alternative account to the lack vs. loss model was offered by a group of 
psychologists that were based at Yale University in the 1980s, and who have 
written a series of influential articles on envy and jealousy: Judith Rodin, Peter 
Salovey and Susan Bers.18 Their account is interesting because they downplay the 
difference between the two emotions: they claim that laypeople use the terms 
interchangeably (as opposed to using jealousy as a synonym for envy, but not vice 
                                                
18 Cf. Bers and Rodin 1984, Salovey and Rodin 1984, 1986, 1988. 
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versa) and that there is no phenomenological difference.19 Thus, they adopt the 
terminology of “social-comparison jealousy” (for envy) and “social-relations 
jealousy” or “romantic jealousy” (for jealousy proper).  
Bers and Rodin do acknowledge some differences between the two 
emotions with regard to personality and situational antecedents (that is, 
circumstances that elicit the emotions) and cognitive and affective consequences 
(in other words, appraisal and affective response to that appraisal): envy arises 
when one’s superiority or equality is perceived as challenged, and jealousy arises 
when one’s exclusivity in a relationship is perceived as threatened.  
Salovey and Rodin adopt the same approach of focusing on antecedents as 
Bers and Rodin, and differentiate between envy and jealousy based on the nature of 
the desired object or goal: in jealousy, the desired object is a person, in envy it is not. 
In both cases, attainment of the desired object is threatened by another person, 
real or imaginary. 
This account, like the lack vs. loss model, enjoys simplicity and symmetry. 
However, it does not account for the many, and central, cases of jealousy in which 
the agent has already attained the desired object. It seems to me that Salovey and 
Rodin end up focusing on what I will describe, in section 5, as hybrid cases of envy 
                                                
19 The phenomenology claim has been disproved by the more recent research reviewed in section 2. As 
with regard to the claim that people use terms interchangeably, I could not find any actual evidence 
presented in their articles. Bers and Rodin 1984 just talks about “examining the literature” (Bers and Rodin 
1984: 766); Salovey and Rodin first cite Bers and Rodin 1984 as the only evidence (Salovey and Rodin 
1984: 780), and then in their 1986 article claim that “although these distinctions between jealousy and envy 
are frequently made in the psychological literature, we found that laypersons rarely made them when we 
conducted extensive pilot testing for two empirical studies of envy (Bers and Rodin 1984; Salovey and 
Rodin 1984). Rather, they used the words jealousy and envy interchangeably and appeared to be referring 
to the same feelings” (Salovey and Rodin 1986: 1100). But they do not provide the results of these pilot 
studies. For these reasons, I discuss their view only as an interesting conceptual proposal, rather than an 
empirical one. 
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and jealousy, where the two emotions are conjoined, and this focus may well 
explain their skepticism that the two emotions are really distinct.   
An account only briefly sketched by Justin D’Arms may be interpreted as 
another view that differentiates between envy and jealousy based on their 
different objects: “the jealous person’s real locus of concern is the beloved—the 
person whose affection he is losing or fears losing—not his rival. […] the envious 
person’s locus of concerns is the rival. […] Roughly for the jealous person the 
rival is fungible and the beloved is not fungible. […] Whereas in envy it is the 
other way around” (D’Arms 2009: 3-4).20  
This account is offered in the context of an encyclopedia entry and is thus 
very minimal. Furthermore, it brings together different elements of different 
models. I mention it nonetheless, because it seems to suggest an intuitive way of 
spelling out the difference between the two emotions: the formal object of 
jealousy is a romantic relationship, whereas the formal object of envy is a 
competitive relationship. However, this model is also problematic, because envy’s 
locus of concern may well be the valued object (Taylor 1988, 2006, and Protasi 
2016). Furthermore, we can be jealous in non-romantic and even non-
interpersonal settings, even if that is rare. Finally, jealousy essentially involves a 
rivalrous and comparative attitude as well.  
D’Arms’ remark on fungibility is correct with regard to jealousy, but it can 
be easily accounted for by the lack vs. loss model: since jealousy is a protective 
reaction to a threat against a valuable object, it will be triggered by any rival. 
                                                
20 D’Arms references Farrell 1980 when he presents it. Purshouse 2004 correctly remarks that Farrell does 
not endorse the view. It is not clear to me to what extent D’Arms himself thinks it is correct. 
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However, the remark is not correct with envy: envy can be very particular, and 
thus be triggered by a specific object that matters to the agent, while the rival may 
be fungible. For instance, a beauty pageant contestant may envy the winner, 
independently of who that is.  
4.3 Jealousy as a Need for Attention Model 
Philosophers Michael Wreen and Leila Tov Ruach (aka Amélie Rorty) present the 
most compelling and attractive alternative to the lack vs. loss model.  
Wreen outright rejects the idea that fear of loss is central in jealousy. He 
claims that: “Most cases of jealousy, I would venture to say, have nothing to do 
with loss or believed loss, whether of love or of special attention” (Wreen 1989: 
640). He goes on to argue that jealousy always involves a sentient being and it is 
essentially concerned with desiring to be accorded “attentive consideration”. He 
then suggests that envy is different insofar as it involves only two parties. Thus, he 
endorses the three-party relation model as well.  He also thinks of jealousy as a 
species of envy.  
As we have seen in the second section, however, psychologists interpret 
the available empirical evidence as showing that envy and jealousy are distinct 
emotions, not one the species of the other. Furthermore, anecdotal and scientific 
evidence shows that fear of loss plays a crucial role in the experience and arousal 
of jealousy, contra Wreen’s personal impression.   
Leila Tov-Ruach presents a rich etiology of jealousy that is strongly 
influenced by a psychoanalytic perspective on infant development. I will set that 
etiology aside and focus on her general conception of jealousy and her 
observations on the differences with envy. 
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Her account positions itself somewhere in between the lack vs. loss model 
and Wreen’s view. She acknowledges that the jealous person is centrally 
preoccupied with some sort of deprivation or loss, and she also remarks that this 
loss need not be of love. One can feel jealousy when her favorite chess partner 
has found another favored chess partner, for instance.21 In this respect, her 
account may be interpreted as a version of the lack vs. loss view. 
But, like Wreen, she thinks that an essential component in jealousy is the 
fear of losing a person’s “formative attentive regard” (Tov-Ruach 1980: 467) due 
to the intervention of a person (generally a romantic or sexual rival, but also, as in 
the chess partner case, any other sort of competitor) or even a thing (such as 
when one is jealous of one’s partner’s work).22  
While I agree with Tov-Ruach and Wreen that in typical cases of romantic 
jealousy, which are our paradigmatic case studies, the need for special and 
exclusive attention plays a central role, there are two reasons to not consider it the 
differentiating element. First, it is not exclusive to jealousy: there are other emotions 
and affective responses that are characterized by the concern of not losing 
another’s attentive consideration. A narcissistic or very self-centered person, for 
instance, may desire to be at the center of attention without thereby feeling 
jealousy (although it might be the case that narcissists are more disposed to feel 
jealousy than other people, but this is just my speculation). 
                                                
21 She correctly observes that we often erroneously infer love from jealousy: we are so used to thinking of 
jealousy exclusively in romantic terms that we take any kind of jealousy to be a symptom of love. 
22 Maria Miceli and Cristiano Castelfranchi (who endorse the lack vs. loss view) also stress the importance 
of keeping in mind non-relational cases of jealousy. Cf. Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007: 471-2.  
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Second, as Aaron Ben-Ze’ev has remarked, there are cases in which the 
subject is jealous of a rival notwithstanding the fact that they are now receiving 
more, not less, attentive consideration: consider the case of a cheating partner who 
becomes more loving and considerate toward the partner’s needs and desires, 
either out of guilt or happiness (Ben-Ze’ev 1990: 494). This increased attentive 
consideration might not prevent the cheated partner from feeling jealousy. She 
might want to be the cause of that renewed happiness, for instance, and might not 
care about the additional attention, because what she is afraid of is losing that 
special role in her partner’s life: being the person who makes him or her happy. 
The desire for attentive consideration, then, is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for jealousy to arise. People value different features in their 
relationships, and value respect, trust, honor, or preserving their social reputation 
more than attention. Loss of attentive consideration may indeed trigger jealousy, 
but so may the loss of any of the above features as well. 
Thus, the lack vs. loss model is broad enough to account for a variety of 
cases of jealousy, which includes jealousy of one’s things, jealousy of a partner’s 
work, jealousy of friends, and of sexual and romantic partners. But, at the same 
time, it is also sufficiently narrow to explain why attentive consideration is so 
salient when we think about jealousy: in the specific cases in which the good to be 
guarded is a romantic or sexual relationship with a person, lack of attention is 
often a symptom that the relationship is at risk. And, of course, it is a lamentable 
loss in itself, to which a defensive response is often appropriate. 
 
 
 21 
4.4 Desire for Exclusivity vs. Desire to Avoid Inferiority Model 
A final account worth considering has been defended by Luke Purshouse.23 He 
focuses on the difference in characteristic evaluative content of envy and jealousy. 
He thinks that, in order for a person to count as jealous, the following conditions 
have to be met: 
a. “He desires to possess a good, possibly to a certain extent, or in a certain way: for 
instance, exclusively or pre-eminently.   
b. He regards the actual or potential possession of this good by another person, the 
rival, as inconsistent with the fulfilment of this desire.   
c. He has in mind some (possibly imagined) set of circumstances in which this 
desire would have been satisfied.”                   
(Purshouse 2004: 195) 
The first two conditions collectively express an understanding of jealousy as 
characterized by perceiving the rival “as possessing, or perhaps as potentially 
possessing, a good at the expense of his possessing it himself” (Purshouse 2004: 
191). Relatedly, Purshouse remarks on the ineluctable particularity of jealousy: while 
enviers may be satisfied by the acquisition of a good that is similar in kind to the 
specific one possessed by the envied, jealous subjects care about a specific good 
(Purshouse 2004: 197).  
Thus, Purshouse sees jealousy necessarily as a zero-sum game. The relation 
between the rival having the good and the subject not having it can be either 
causal or logical (Purshouse 2004: 192): either the rival is the cause of the agent’s 
                                                
23 Rachel Fredericks defends a version of Pursehouse’s account in her dissertation (Frederick 2012). 
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deprivation, or the rival’s ownership of the good logically implies that the subject 
cannot possess it as she wishes. Under this second category falls the case in which 
the subject already possesses the good. Therefore, what the lack vs. loss model sees 
as the central, paradigmatic example of jealousy is only a subset of cases for 
Purshouse, which strikes me as an unpalatable consequence of the account. So 
many cases of jealousy are cases where the subject already possesses what she 
desires; the very popularity of the lack vs. loss model is an indirect proof of the 
prevalence of these cases.  
 Furthermore, the elements of the model that I do find correctly 
individuated—the desire for exclusive possession of a good, and the related fact 
that jealousy is ineluctably particular and cannot be satisfied by substitution—can 
be accounted for by the lack vs. loss model: when we possess, or see as 
possessing, or hope we can soon possess a certain important good, and we feel 
threatened in our actual or possible possession, then we become protective over 
it. This is not the same as saying that, when we have something, we desire to have 
it exclusively tout court, in the absence of such a threat. I may be perfectly happy that 
my close friend has many other friends, including other friends who are as close 
as, or even closer to her than, me, until I notice that she starts confiding less in me 
and that she prefers to go out with this other person at the expense of the time 
she used to devote to me. I did not previously have a desire for exclusivity, and in 
some sense I still don’t. But I fear I am losing something I previously had, and I 
become jealous of the person who is seemingly responsible for this change.  
 A final problem with Purshouse’s account is that he programmatically 
eschews a discussion of the affective elements, the situational antecedents and the 
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behavioral consequences of jealousy. All of those support an emphasis on loss: 
people feel afraid of losing their beloved; they feel jealousy in situations that can 
be aptly described as threats to existing relationships and other “possessions”; and 
they behave protectively toward what they have, rather than trying to obtain what 
they do not.  
 The latter is the typical behavioral manifestations of envy. Purshouse 
describes envy as “involving a negative attitude to a distribution on grounds that it 
comprises one’s own inferiority to another” (Purshouse 2004: 195). This is a very 
thin definition of envy, which fails to differentiate it from a general sense of 
inferiority. For all these reasons, I find Purshouse’s account unsatisfying.  
 
5. Complications: Ambiguous, Hybrid, and Borderline Cases   
Like any theoretical model that attempts to simplify a complex and messy reality, 
the lack vs. loss model is not going to perfectly capture every contrast between 
lived experiences of envy and jealousy. In this section, I consider situations with 
which the view seems to struggle.  
 First, we have seen that envy and jealousy often co-occur. In some 
contexts, they co-occur systemically: think of sibling rivalry. When a new child is 
born, the older sibling may fear that her special relationship with her parents will 
be affected. Even aside from special circumstances, children often vie for the 
limited parental resources, and find themselves behaving at the same time 
defensively and aggressively. If they perceive to have a special relation of some 
kind with a parent, they will be afraid to lose it. If they perceive the other siblings 
to be better off in some respect, they will want to outperform them. As we have 
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seen, comparisons are widespread, often unconscious, and almost unavoidable in 
general, and siblings in particular are continuously, and sometimes unfairly or 
inappropriately, compared to each other along a variety of dimensions, not only 
by their parents, but also by relatives, family friends, teachers and so forth. 
Therefore, both rivalrous emotions of envy and jealousy are likely to arise.  
In similar circumstances, it may be hard, above all from a first-personal 
perspective, to distinguish between what’s perceived as owned but in danger of 
being lost, and what’s perceived as lacked but potentially attainable. Young 
children, especially, may not have a sufficiently articulate conception of what’s at 
stake, and their emotional experience may be less defined as a consequence: their 
beliefs will be primitive, their desires inchoate, their feelings mixed, intense and 
confusing. The emotion felt toward one sibling may not be easily diagnosed as 
one of either envy or jealousy. This kind of epistemic ambiguity, however, is not 
unusual when it comes to emotions, and it is to be expected in the case of close, 
frequently co-occurring emotions such as envy and jealousy.  
More interesting are what I call hybrid cases, where both a loss and a lack 
are at stake. Imagine the following situation: 
Ugly Duckling never felt loved by her mother. Her sisters were always complimented, supported, 
looked after in material and spiritual ways, but since she was always the shiest and least “shiny” 
among them, she never got her mother’s affections. Ugly Duckling is intensely jealous of her 
sisters.24 
                                                
24 This is not an unusual pattern for children, and above all daughters, of narcissistic mothers. Cf. McBride 
2009. Thanks to Maria Miceli for stimulating my thoughts on this kind of case.  
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Notice how natural it is in this case to want to use ‘jealous’. At the same time, the 
emotion seems to be a mixture of envy and jealousy according to the lack vs. loss 
model. Ugly Duckling thinks her mother never loved her, and one cannot lose 
what one never had. So technically, according to our model, we would have to say 
that Ugly Duckling is envious. But that does not sound quite right. Wreen and 
Tov Ruach would make this the prototypical case of jealousy: what Ugly Duckling 
desperately desires is her mother’s attentive care. 
 I agree that this is what she desires. But notice that parents are expected to 
love their children. Maybe children do not have a right to be loved, strictly 
speaking,25 but they certainly have a reasonable expectation to be loved, and not 
just reasonable, but an emotionally warranted one. By “emotionally warranted” I 
mean that emotionally healthy children are justified in expecting their parents to 
love them. So while Ugly Duckling has never had her mother’s love, she perceives 
it as being in some important sense “due” to her, and so do we. Jealousy is often 
associated, if not with entitlement proper, at least with an appearance of it: when 
we own something, we tend to think we have a right to it, and a right to protect it 
from threats. We interpret Ugly Duckling’s emotion as jealousy because in many 
other counterfactually near worlds Ugly Duckling would have had her mother’s 
love, and she would have every right to be protective about it. 
Thus I can grant that such an example cannot count as a standard case of 
jealousy according to lack vs. loss model, because it is not a standard situation, 
                                                
25 But see Liao 2015 for a defense of this thesis.  
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given that most parents love all of their children, even when they have preferences 
among them.  
  Another hybrid case is the following, drawn from a popular American TV 
series (The Office):  
Jim is in love with his coworker Pam, but Pam is already engaged with Roy. Pam does not know 
what she feels. She thinks of Jim as a good friend, but she is not yet ready to admit feeling more 
than friendly love. Roy is intensely jealous of Jim, and also envies him for being of a superior 
social and intellectual standing. 
Roy’s emotions toward Jim are pretty easy to decipher and understand: he 
becomes aware that he has a romantic rival. Pam is clearly attracted to Jim, and 
Jim is—this is obvious from the audience’s perspective—a much more desirable 
partner for Pam. But what does Jim feel toward Roy? 
Jim is not in a romantic relationship with Pam, but would want to be in 
one. He lacks what Roy has, and so we would expect him to feel envy. But this 
does not sound right, as it did not sound right in Ugly Ducking’s case. While Jim 
might feel a tinge of envy for the man who has what he lacks, and while he might 
be wounded in his self-esteem because Pam does not seem to see his being a 
more desirable partner than Roy, it seems that Jim mostly feels jealousy.26  
Again, the proponents of an attention-based view would think of this case 
as central, and this may indeed be the strongest case for them. However, the lack 
                                                
26 Jerome Neu analyzes a similar case: “How are we to describe the emotional state of the third party in 
situations where there are two lovers, one of whom is jealous over the other and fears the encroachments 
of the third party, while the third party has not made any advances but certainly desires to supplant the 
jealous lover?” (Neu 1980: 434). His verdict is that the third party feels “admiring envy”. I find this 
response unconvincing in a case like Jim’s, since he has a friendly relation with Pam. So maybe Neu and I 
agree: the least Jim already perceives himself as “possessing the good”, the more what he feels counts as 
envy rather than jealousy. Neu too endorses the lack vs. loss view.  
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vs. loss view has again the means to account for this case. Jim is in love with Pam. 
While he does not have a socially sanctioned relation with her, he is her close 
friend and confidant, and he is emotionally committed to her. For a long time 
(until he comes to believe—erroneously—that she will never leave Roy) he does 
not date anyone else and he devotes her a great deal of care and attention. Thus, 
he does have an exclusive relationship with her that nobody else, not even Roy, 
has. So, on the one hand he is rightly concerned that Pam’s marriage to Roy will 
extinguish their relation; on the other hand, he, like Ugly Duckling, is emotionally 
warranted in expecting Pam’s reciprocation, and may think of Roy, consciously or 
not, as an obstacle to that reciprocation. 
Finally, Jim’s hybrid emotion is different from a borderline case such as the 
following: 
George realizes that his husband Altman is cheating on him with another man, Wataru. He 
first becomes jealous and tries to win his love back, but comes to realize that the sense of betrayal 
has weakened their relationship and he is falling out of love for Altman. However, when he 
thinks of his former rival Wataru he feels envious: George perceives Wataru as a 2.0 version of 
himself—younger, fitter, and smarter. 
Hybrid cases are different from borderline cases. In borderline cases one is 
in a transitional phase from an emotion to the other. At some point in between 
the transition, it is metaphysically vague what George is feeling, whether jealousy or 
envy. Figuring that out may be relevant if he is trying to understand whether he 
still feels attached to Altman, whether he should try to preserve his relationship 
with him.  
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Phenomenological considerations, while not decisive, given that the two 
emotions share some feelings (such as negative affect and hostility toward the 
rival), may nonetheless provide some clue: if George wishes he were more like 
Wataru, would like to improve himself, feels ashamed and a failure, and is overall 
more focused on his personal inadequacy than on losing Altman, then he is 
probably feeling more envy than jealousy; if he is pained by Altman’s absence and 
feels lonely and abandoned, but at the same time feels distrust toward him, then 
he is probably feeling more jealousy than envy.27 
The lack vs. loss model nicely makes sense of this transition: George’s 
emotions end up being different because his situation and focus change. He 
moves from being concerned with guarding his particular valued relationship to 
Altman (a good he has, but is afraid to lose) to being concerned with his 
inferiority to Wataru with regard to the general valuable good of being loved by 
someone like Altman (a good he currently lacks and would like to acquire again). 
Ambiguous, hybrid, and borderline cases characterize our emotional 
experience in general and are not unique to envy and jealousy. They do, however, 
complicate our discussion and assessment of different conceptual tools and ways 
of explaining the difference between these similar emotions. I hope to have 
shown in this concluding section that the lack vs. loss model can handle them 
well.28  
  
                                                
27 Notice that I take feelings to be clues that inform us about the implicit, underlying appraisal, in line with 
an overall cognitive approach: I don’t think the feelings determine the distinction itself.  
28 For helpful feedback on this essay I would like to thank: William Beardsley, Douglas Cannon, Shen-yi 
Liao, Justin Tiehen, Ariela Tubert, and four anonymous reviewers. 
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